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Abstract 
We document that firms’ management of accounting earnings increased steadily from 
1987 until the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), with a significant increase 
during the period prior to SOX, followed by a significant decline after passage of SOX. 
However, the increase in earnings management preceding SOX was primarily in poorly 
performing industries. We also show that the informativeness of earnings increased 
steadily over time, and there was no significant change in earnings informativeness 
following the passage of SOX. Further, we find that earnings management increased the 
absolute informativeness of earnings, but reduced the informativeness for a given 
earnings surprise, as well as reduced the abnormal return for a given amount of earnings 
surprise.  Finally, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the opportunistic behavior of 
managers, primarily related to the fraction of compensation derived from options, was 
significantly associated with earnings management in the period preceding SOX.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent wave of corporate governance failures has raised concerns about the 
integrity of the information provided to investors, resulting in a drop in investor 
confidence (Jain, Kim and Rezaee, 2003; Rezaee and Jain, 2003; Rezaee, 2002).  These 
highly publicized failures culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) on 
July 30, 2002.1  Upon signing SOX, President George W. Bush stated that this Act 
constitutes “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”2  The head of the AICPA commented that SOX “contains 
some of the most far-reaching changes that Congress has ever introduced to the business 
world.”3  However, although SOX proposes sweeping changes, the implications of the 
law and subsequent regulatory changes are yet to be ascertained.  
We focus on two research questions.  First, we investigate the trends in and potential 
determinants of corporate earnings management activities in the periods preceding and 
following the passage of SOX.  Specifically, we analyze whether managerial 
opportunism or events exogenous to the firms (such as changes in economic conditions) 
contributed to changes in earnings management.  Second, we investigate investors’ 
reactions to earnings announcements before and after the passage of SOX.  Specifically, 
earnings management is likely to be informative in its own right (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986).  However, earnings management, particularly if it results from agency conflicts 
between shareholders and management, is likely to make it more difficult to infer the 
                                                 
1 On May 6th, 2003 at a governance conference at the Kellogg School of Management, Senator Davenport 
stated “Congress had to act.” 
2 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Bush Signs Bill aimed at Fraud in Corporations,” N.Y. Times, July 31, 2002. 
3 Barry C. Melancon, “A New Accounting Culture,” www.aicpa.org, September 4, 2002. 
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actual level of corporate performance.  As a result, earnings management is likely to 
affect the relation between earnings and stock price changes.   
We begin by examining earnings management over time.  The purpose of this 
analysis is to investigate whether the events leading to the passage of SOX were indeed 
characterized by a wide-spread increase in earnings management, as opposed to a few 
highly publicized events.  We conduct our analysis by dividing the sample period into 
two periods:  the period prior to the passage of SOX (the pre-SOX period: Q1, 1987 
through Q2, 2002), and the period after the passage of SOX (the post-SOX period: Q3, 
2002 through Q4, 2003).  We further subdivide the pre-SOX period into two sub-periods 
using the “Corporate Scandal Sheet” developed by Forbes (Forbes 2002): the period prior 
to the major corporate scandals (the pre-SCA period: Q1, 1987 through Q2, 2001) and the 
period during which the major scandals occurred (the SCA period: Q3, 2001 through Q2, 
2002).4  We document that the pre-SOX period was characterized by rapidly increasing 
earnings management that reached a peak during the SCA period.  Thus, our evidence 
indicates that the problem was much more endemic, and not due to “a few bad apples.”  
However, our analysis indicates that this increase is concentrated in poorly performing 
industries.  Thus, either poorly performing firms are more likely to resort to earnings 
management, or currently available techniques are unable to adequately control for 
earnings management that is due to changing economic conditions (Dechow, Kothari, 
and Watts, 1998; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2004).  Following the passage of SOX 
earnings management reversed abruptly, and this result is robust with respect to industry 
performance.   
                                                 
4 Such subdivision may induce hindsight bias into the analysis. However, a preliminary analysis shows that 
the data exhibit significant time trends (non-stationarity), and we feel that such partitioning of the sample 
period enables a more meaningful interpretation of the results.   
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We then investigate one determinant of earnings management activities, labeling this 
hypothesis as the “opportunistic behavior hypothesis” (OBH).  This hypothesis maintains 
that high earnings management activity during the pre-SOX period was driven by 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors.  Specifically, we examine whether the incentives 
derived from bonus and option compensation were related to the level of earnings 
management during this period.  
Our evidence is partially consistent with the OBH as a motivation for high earnings 
management. In particular, we find that the fraction of compensation derived from 
options was significantly associated with the level of earnings management in the pre-
SOX period, even after controlling for general economic conditions.  However, we do not 
find an association between the fraction of compensation derived from bonus contracts 
and earnings management.  We interpret our result as suggesting that the scandals did not 
represent isolated cases of corporate frauds, but rather represented an increase in the 
degree of accounting management in the SCA period.  Moreover, although the finding of 
a decline in opportunistic behavior in the period following the passage of SOX does 
provide evidence of an impact of this Act, we cannot attribute this decline solely to SOX 
due to a number of concurrent events in the post-SOX period.  For example, the most 
egregious behaviors resulted in highly publicized enforcement actions, and such actions 
are likely to have had a damping effect on opportunistic behavior.   
Next, we investigate the trends in earnings informativeness and how earnings 
management affects the informativeness of earnings in the pre-SCA, SCA and post-SOX 
periods.  We use two measures of informativeness: the volatility of security returns in the 
three-day window centered on earnings announcement dates – a non directional measure 
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(Beaver, 1968) – and the association between earnings surprises and stock price changes 
– a directional measure (Ball and Brown, 1968).  Our evidence indicates that the 
volatility of stock returns around earnings announcements is positively associated with 
earnings management – that is earnings management is informative (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  However, earnings management reduces the association between 
earnings surprises and both the variance and the mean stock returns around earnings 
announcements.  Jointly, our results are consistent with the notion that earnings 
management is informative but lowers the ‘quality of earnings.’  Finally, after controlling 
for earnings management, we do not find evidence suggesting an increase in the 
informativeness of earnings in the post-SOX period.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a discussion of 
the institutional background on the major corporate scandals that took place in 2001-2002 
and the passage of SOX.  Section 3 develops the hypothesis and presents an overview of 
the related literature.  Section 4 discusses the various measures of earnings management 
and earnings informativeness used in the study. Data and the research methods are 
described in Section 5, followed by a discussion of the results in Section 6.  Section 7 
discusses some robustness checks and Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
A string of major accounting scandals began with the unraveling of Enron 
Corporation in late 2001.  Enron’s activities over the preceding four years included the 
failure to make proper disclosures concerning various related-party transactions and to 
account for off-balance-sheet transactions.  A number of criminal and civil investigations 
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followed, along with the company’s bankruptcy filing.  The various governance failures 
that followed Enron involved distinctly different types of misbehaviors, ranging from the 
widely publicized case of Global Crossing’s dubious financial reporting to that of 
Adelphia Communications Corp., and Tyco International Limited’s sweetheart loans to 
executives.5  Figure 1 provides a timeline of the major accounting scandals that occurred 
in 2001-2002.  The dates of these scandals were obtained from Forbes’ “Corporate 
Scandal Sheet” (Forbes, 2002) and verified by checking the Dow Jones News Retrieval 
Services.  These multi-billion dollar governance failures created losses for millions of 
ordinary investors and raised questions about the reliability of financial reporting.   
One consequence of these events was the passage of SOX in 2002, the result of 
Congressional hearings conducted since the first admissions of fraudulent behavior made 
by Enron.  President Bush signed SOX, also known as the Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, into law on July 30, 2002.  SOX introduces 
new provisions for management, directors, auditors and analysts, and significantly raises 
criminal penalties for securities fraud, for destroying, altering or fabricating records in 
federal investigations or any scheme or attempt to defraud shareholders.  
 
3.  Hypotheses Development and Literature Review 
3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses Development 
We investigate changes in firms’ earnings management activities and investors’ 
reactions to those activities with reference to Congress’s and regulators’ responses to the 
recent corporate scandals.  In particular, we investigate whether the level of earnings 
                                                 
5 Other stories of accounting improprieties included companies such as WorldCom Inc., Qwest 
Communications International Inc., AOL Time Warner, Rite Aid Corp., Xerox Corp., and ImClone 
Systems Inc. 
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management changed over the sample period and potential reasons for those changes.  
Next, we analyze the changes in the informativeness of earnings over the sample period, 
and the impact of earnings management on the informativeness of earnings, relying on 
the evidence in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) that 
earnings manipulation per se is informative.  
We focus on one theory to explain earnings management behavior of firms, and its 
effect on the informativeness of earnings: the “opportunistic behavior hypothesis” 
(OBH).  OBH predicts that managers’ choices of accounting practices are influenced by 
their impact on compensation.    
OBH has four empirical predictions.  First, changes in reported earnings are affected 
by changes in the compensation and incentives of managers.6  Second, even after 
controlling for managerial incentives, OBH predicts that earnings management would 
decline after the passage of SOX, either because of the sanctions imposed on managers 
by the Act or because of the adverse publicity and legal costs imposed on executives and 
firms who were accused of fraudulent reporting practices.7  Third, earnings management 
is informative when managers possess inside information and have incentives to mange 
earnings (e.g., because of compensation contracts).  Therefore we expect an association 
between our proxy for earnings management and stock return volatility.  Finally, the 
association between stock returns and earnings surprises depends on investors’ 
perceptions on whether earnings management is motivated by managers’ attempts to 
                                                 
6 For the purpose of this discussion, we consider those changes as exogenous.  Of course, tests of OBH 
become difficult, if changes in the compensation packages are the result of changes in economic activities 
or outlooks.  We address this issue by investigating the impact of compensation after controlling for 
economic conditions.   
7 As indicated in the introduction, it is difficult to attribute the change in earnings management to SOX 
versus other concurrent events. For instance, the period following the scandals is likely to be marked by 
greater investor alertness and increased scrutiny by auditors and regulators, reducing firms’ propensity to 
manage earnings. 
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communicate inside information or by managers’ opportunistic behavior.  In the former 
(latter) case, higher earnings management will result in a given earnings surprise 
resulting in a larger (smaller) change in security prices.  In other words, the level of 
earnings management affects the precision that investors attribute to a given earnings 
signal.  In turn, the higher the precision of the earnings signal, the higher the earnings 
response (e.g., measurement errors bias regression coefficients towards zero).  Thus, 
there exists a link between earnings management and investors responses to earnings 
signals. 
 
3.2 Related Studies 
Research documenting the trend in earnings management over time indicates that the 
tendency to manage earnings has increased over time (Brown, 2001; Bartov et. al., 2002; 
Lopez and Rees, 2001).  This literature also provides evidence that managerial propensity 
to avoid negative earnings surprises has increased significantly over time (Brown, 2001; 
Bartov et. al, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002), although no significant increase has been 
observed in the tendency to avoid losses or earnings decreases (Burgstahler and Eames, 
2003).   
Brown and Caylor (2003) conduct a temporal analyses of the propensities of 
managers to achieve three earnings management thresholds and their valuation 
consequences using quarterly data from 1985-2001.  They find that early in their study 
period (1985-1993), managers tried to avoid losses and earnings decreases more than to 
avoid negative earnings surprises.  However, in the subsequent time period (1994-2001) 
they find that managers exhibited a greater inclination to avoid negative earnings 
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surprises than to avoid losses, and in the last six years of the study (1996-2001) managers 
preferred to avoid negative earnings surprises than earnings decreases.  They conclude 
that managers took their cues from capital markets, making negative earnings surprise 
avoidance their most preferred threshold in recent years, proposing that increased media 
coverage may be responsible for this shift.     
In this paper we provide further evidence on the trend in earnings management 
activities of firms, with specific focus on the level of earnings management surrounding 
the period of heightened corporate misconduct, beginning in late 2001.  We also examine 
the change in earnings management activity after the passage of SOX.   
Studies on the informativeness of earnings have typically focused on the relation 
between earnings informativeness and various institutional and governance features of 
companies.  Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) document a relation between informativeness 
and managerial ownership, as well as between informativeness and external 
blockholdings.  Gul and Wah (2002) focus on the market reaction to accounting earnings 
conditioned on two important corporate governance variables: insider entrenchment (high 
insider share ownership) and board leadership structure in terms of CEO duality (no 
separation between CEO and board chairman).  They find that at a very high level of 
insider shareholding (entrenched insiders), is associated with a lower informativeness. 
Other studies provide evidence demonstrating an association between earnings 
informativeness and the levels of stock compensation (Behn, Nagy and Riley, 2002), the 
probability of termination of an entity (Subramanyam and Wild, 1996), and the cost of 
equity and trading in the stock of a country (Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker, 2002).  
We contribute to this literature by documenting the trends in and potential determinants 
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of earnings informativeness over time, with particular reference to the corporate scandals 
and the passage of SOX. 
SOX generated considerable interest in the academic community.  Jain, Kim and 
Rezaee (2003) show wider bid-ask spreads, lower depths, and higher adverse selection 
component of spreads in the period surrounding the corporate scandals: findings that 
support their hypothesis of loss in investor confidence in the financial reporting process. 
They also find evidence consistent with an increase in investor confidence after the 
passage of SOX.  
Jain and Rezaee (2003) document positive abnormal returns around dates 
corresponding to the passage of SOX, suggesting that the market reacted positively to the 
passage of the Act and possible implementation effects of its provisions.  They also 
report that firms with bigger balance sheet sizes, higher price-earnings ratios, and higher 
earnings retention ratios were affected more by the Act compared to other firms.  
Bhattacharya, Groznik and Haslem (2002) find no evidence that the CEO and CFO 
certification requirements were significantly priced by investors.  In a recent study Li, 
Pincus and Rego (2003) find no differences in stock returns between firms that manage 
earnings extensively and firms which manage earnings to a lesser degree, and between 
firms with effective versus ineffective audit committees, for individual SOX event dates.   
Lobo and Zhou (2005) investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resulting 
requirement by the SEC that financial statements be certified by firms’ CEOs and CFOs 
resulted in an increase in the conservatism in financial reporting. They document less 
income-increasing earnings management in the year of certification by their CEO/CFOs 
than in the immediately preceding year, and faster incorporation of losses than gains in 
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income in the certification year than in the year preceding certification. They interpret 
this as suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resultant SEC requirement that 
CEO/CFOs certify their financial statements enhanced the quality of reported earnings by 
making them more conservative. In summary, studies on the effects of SOX have 
produced inconsistent results, possibly due to the limited time period available 
subsequent to SOX.  
 
4.  Empirical Constructs 
In this section we describe the proxies used to measure earnings management and the 
informativeness of earnings.   Section 4.1 describes our proxies for earnings management 
while section 4.2 discusses two informativeness measures, namely an absolute 
informativeness, and a directional measure to analyze the change in the informativeness 
of earnings.   
 
4.1 Earnings Management 
Based on prior research, we rely on earnings management measures commonly used 
in the literature, including (i) three measures of discretionary accruals, (ii) the ratio of the 
absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows from operation, (iii) the 
ratio of the change in accounts receivables to the change in sales, (iv) the ratio of the 
change in inventory to the change in sales, and (v) the frequency of special items reported 
for the period.8  While these proxies for earnings management are widely used in the 
                                                 
8 Since we are relying on a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, we require one observation per 
company quarter.  Therefore, we do not use two additional metrics which have been commonly used in 
prior research: the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income to standard deviation of cash flows 
(Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2001; Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker, 2001; Zarowin, 2002), nor the 
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literature (Jones, 1991; Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 
1996; and Elliott and Hanna, 1996), each has some limitations, that is, each proxy is an 
imperfect measure of earnings management.  To reduce the measurement error contained 
in any single measure, we compute the common element contained in all of them using 
principle factor analysis.  The individual components of our earnings management proxy 
are discussed next. 
 
4.1.1 Discretionary Accruals 
One of the most common metrics used in the literature to detect earnings management 
is the magnitude of discretionary accruals, which proxies for the discretion used by 
managers to achieve their financial reporting goals.  The standard model used by prior 
research in attempting to identify discretionary (or “unexpected”) accruals is based on 
Jones (1991).  Total accruals are regressed on variables, which are expected to vary with 
nondiscretionary accruals, and the unexplained portion (i.e., the residuals) is interpreted 
as discretionary accruals.  These models have been used either in a time-series firm-
specific framework, or they have been estimated in the cross-section for each industry 
(e.g., Subramanyam, 1996).   We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, 
where for each quarter we estimate the model for every industry classified by its 2-digit 
SIC code.  Thus, our approach controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions 
that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik, 
1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 9 
                                                                                                                                                 
contemporaneous correlation between changes in accounting accruals and changes in operating cash flows 
(Myers and Skinner, 1999; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2001; Zarowin, 2002).   
9 We obtain qualitatively the same results when we use a time-series approach which assumes temporal 
stationarity of the parameters for each firm. 
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Our first model is the modified cross-sectional Jones model discussed in DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998).  This model assumes that the change in revenues less the change 
in accounts receivable is free from managerial discretion (i.e., credit sales are assumed to 
be discretionary).  The modified Jones model is estimated for each 2-digit SIC-quarter 
grouping as follows: 
 εββα jq
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jq
jq
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jqjq
jq
Asset
PPE
Asset
ARSales
AssetAsset
TA ++∆−∆+=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
)(1  (1) 
 
where for firm j and quarter q, TAjq is the total accruals, defined as earnings minus cash 
flow; Ajq represents total assets; ∆Salesjq is the change in sales; ∆ARjq is the change in 
accounts receivables; and PPEjq represents gross property, plant, and equipment.10  We 
use current cash flows from operations, excluding extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (CFO), to calculate accruals. 
Industry-quarter specific parameters obtained from equation (1) are used to estimate 
firm-quarter specific nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) as a percent of lagged total assets: 
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+∆−∆+= ββα   (2) 
Our first measure of discretionary accruals DA1 is the difference between TAjq/Assetsjq-1 
and NDAjq. We use the absolute value of DA1 as a measure of discretionary accruals. 
 A major criticism of discretionary accruals models is that they can classify 
nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary.  To mitigate this concern, we use two 
additional models to estimate discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 2003; McNichols, 
2000; Larcker and Richardson, 2003) as well other metrics measuring earnings 
management (see below).  Previous research has shown that measures of unexpected 
                                                 
10 Throughout the paper we depict variables through italics, while constructs are not italicized.  For 
example, ROA is an acronym for return on assets, but ROA represents the variable return on assets.    
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accruals are more likely to be misspecified for firms with extreme levels of performance 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999).  In particular, Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik 
(1999) document that estimated discretionary accruals are negative for firms with low 
earnings and positive for firms with high earnings.  To address this issue, we use the 
modified Jones model specified in equation (1), where we include a measure of current 
operating performance, the current cash flows from operations excluding extraordinary 
items, as a control variable: 
εβββα jq
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The third model relies on the discussion in McNichols (2000), Dechow et al. (2003) 
and Larcker and Richardson (2003).  Since accruals are changes in working capital 
accounts, one would expect fast growing firms to have larger accruals (McNichols 2000, 
2002).   In line with this prediction, we include the book-to-market ratio (BM) as a proxy 
for expected growth in firm’s operations.11  BM is measured as the ratio of the book value 
of common equity to the market value of common equity:  
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The industry-quarter-specific parameters obtained from equations (3) and (4), 
respectively, are used to estimate firm-quarter-specific nondiscretionary accruals as a 
percent of lagged total assets, as in the first model specified in equation (1).   Our second 
and third measures of discretionary accruals are DA2 and DA3, where each of the 
estimates is the difference between TAjq/Assetsjq-1 and the predicted value based on the 
estimated parameters (i.e., the residual value).  
                                                 
11 Dechow et al. (2003) show that such an advanced model has a greater explanatory power than the cross-
sectional modified Jones model.  
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4.1.2 Additional Metrics of Earnings Management  
We use the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of cash 
flow from operations (|TA|/|CFO|), the ratio of the change in accounts receivable to the 
change in sales (∆AR/∆SALES), and the ratio of the change in inventories to the change in 
sales (∆INV/∆SALES) as three additional measures of earnings management.  We include 
the latter two measures to capture incidences of “channel stuffing,” another common 
method firms use to manage earnings.    
Managers may also use individual accounts to reach earnings targets.  We take this 
possibility into account and compute an additional earnings management metric using the 
value of special items reported for the period.  We compute this metric using the value of 
special items for the period scaled by the total assets at the beginning of the period.  
Following Elliott and Hanna (1996), we define a negative write-off as a negative special 
item exceeding 1% of the beginning of the quarter total assets.  For each firm-quarter we 
compute the frequency of negative special items (Negative Write-offs) and use this as 
another measure of earnings management.  Using the individual variables discussed in 
section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, we construct an over-all index, discussed next.   
 
4.1.3 Earnings Management Score 
Although the above earnings management metrics are commonly used in the 
accounting literature, earnings management by its very nature is not observable, and there 
exists no consensus regarding the “best” measure of earnings management.  The literature 
provides several concerns about using each measure as a proxy for earnings management.   
One important criticism is that firms may employ several tools to manage earnings, and 
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focusing on a single measure may not be the right approach. To address this issue we 
perform principal factor analysis to construct an index of earnings management for each 
firm-quarter, by aggregating the common information across the different measures.  This 
approach is likely to capture the overall level of earnings management in a firm more 
effectively than any of the single measures.12  We refer to this overall measure of 
earnings management as EM_SCOREjq.   
 
4.2 Informativeness Metrics 
We use two measures of the informativeness of earnings disclosures.  The first metric 
(ANNVARjq), measures the abnormal return variance in the three-day quarterly earnings 
announcement window for each firm j and quarter q (Beaver, 1968).  Abnormal return for 
a firm j on day t (ARj,t) is defined as the return of firm j minus the value-weighted market 
return on day t.  We compute ANNVARjq as:   
 ∑
∈
∈∈ −=
j
jj
At
AtjAtjjq ARARANNVAR
2
,, ][  (5) 
where for firm j and quarter q, Aj represents the three-day announcement period centered 
on the announcement date of quarter q, and jAtjAR ∈, represents the average abnormal 
return for the three-day announcement period.  Notice that ANNVARjq is a non-directional 
measure of absolute information content in the sense that quarters with a large 
information flow are likely to have large announcement period return variances.            
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that the factor analysis procedure may be capturing the common measurement error 
across the various individual variables. However, if that were true then we should not observe any 
significant associations in any of our tests.  Moreover, we perform two robustness checks (see Section 7 for 
a description of these tests) which confirm that this metric is not merely an aggregation of measurement 
errors.  
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To investigate the interaction between earnings management and earnings surprises 
we use the sum of the announcement period abnormal returns as a second metric 
(ANNRETjq):   
 ∑
∈
∈=
j
j
At
Atjjq ARANNRET ,  (6) 
We use ANNRETjq to study the direction of the market response to earnings 
announcements.  
 
5. Data and Research Method 
5.1 Data Selection and Sample Description 
The sample is obtained from the COMPUSTAT quarterly industrial and research files 
and CRSP daily files for the period 1987-2003.  We restrict our sample to all nonfinancial 
firms with available data, and require at least 8 observations in each 2-digit SIC-quarter 
grouping. We require that each firm-quarter observation has the data necessary to 
calculate the three discretionary accruals metrics.  This restriction likely introduces a 
survivorship bias into the sample resulting in larger and more successful firms.  We 
expect that this will reduce the variation in our earnings management metrics thus 
making it a conservative test of our research questions.   
Following Collins and Hribar (2002), we use cash flows from operations obtained 
from the Statement of Cash Flows reported under the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 95 (SFAS No. 95, FASB 1987).13  The sample period of 1987-2003 
permits us to use SFAS No. 95 statement of cash flow data to estimate accruals, rather 
                                                 
13 SFAS No. 95 requires firms to present a statement of cash flows for fiscal years ending after July 15, 
1988. Some firms early-adopted SFAS No. 95, so our sample begins in 1987. 
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than a balance sheet approach. Stock return data is obtained from CRSP.  At present, 
COMPUSTAT data are available through Q4, 2003, while the CRSP daily stock return 
file extends through December 31, 2002.  Our analysis of earnings management relies on 
data through Q4, 2003, and the analysis of the informativeness of earnings only uses 
sample points corresponding to the intersection of the observations from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP.    
The sample obtained from COMPUSTAT consists of 10,504 firms representing 
185,196 firm-quarter observations.  Merging this sample with the CRSP daily file results 
in a sample of 5,538 firms representing 80,963 firm-quarter observations (the full 
sample).  To test our hypothesis, we use managerial compensation and incentives data 
from ExecuComp, which is available only from 1992 onwards.  Thus, merging the full 
sample with ExecuComp limits the sample period to 1992 through 2003, reducing the 
sample to 2,078 firms and 33,581 firm-quarter observations (the ExecuComp sample).   
 
5.2 Research Method 
5.2.1 Event Periods 
In our analysis we focus on earnings management and the informativeness of 
accounting disclosures across two main time periods – the pre-SOX period (further 
classified into the pre-SCA and the SCA periods), and the post-SOX period.  The 
classification into the different time periods analyzed in this study is based on the period 
of the major corporate scandals (based on Forbes’ “Corporate Scandal Sheet,” Forbes 
2002) and the passage of SOX.  The pre-SOX period extends from Q1, 1987 through Q2, 
2002, and the post-SOX period extends from Q3, 2002 through Q4, 2003.  Within the 
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pre-SOX period, we classify the period from Q1, 1987 through Q2, 2001 as the pre-SCA 
period, and the period from Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002 as the SCA period.  Figure 2 
depicts these different time periods analyzed.  
Table 1A provides summary statistics of the full sample while Table 1B provides 
summary statistics of the ExecuComp sample.14  As indicated in the tables, both samples 
are dominated by large firms.  More importantly, requiring the availability of CRSP and 
ExecuComp data while considerably increasing firm size, does not seem to have a 
significant impact on fundamental measures such as leverage, growth of sales, or market 
to book ratios. 
 
5.2.2 Determinants of Earnings Management and Earnings Informativeness  
We begin our analysis by testing the trends in and determinants of the level of 
earnings management over time by estimating the following regression: 
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GDPBIGSOXSCATimeQTimeQ
TimeQTimeQQQSCOREEM
jqjqjq
jqjqjqjqjq
qjq
jq
××+××+×+
××+××+×+×+
×+×+×+×+××+××+
××+×+×+×+×+=
181716
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_
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 (7) 
 
In the above equation, EM_SCOREjq, is the score obtained by principal factor analysis of 
the six earnings management metrics (three discretionary accruals measures, ratio of the 
absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows from operations, ratio of the 
change in accounts receivables to the change in sales, ratio of the change in inventories to 
the change in sales and the frequency of negative special items); Q1, Q2, and Q3 are 
quarter dummies; Time is the calendar year minus 1987; SCA is a dummy variable that is 
                                                 
14 Whenever possible, we perform the tests on both the full and the ExecuComp samples to assess the 
impact of the ExecuComp selection on our results. 
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equal to 1 for the time period Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002, and 0 otherwise (represents the 
SCA period); SOX is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all fiscal quarters ending 
after Q3, 2002, and 0 otherwise (represents the post-SOX period); BIG is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a big-eight audit firm (or their successors); GDP is the 
percent change in the real gross domestic product from the previous quarter (a proxy of 
overall economic activity); and IND_ROAjq is the average return on assets of firm j’s 
two-digit industry (a proxy for industry-specific economic activity), computed after 
excluding the return on assets of firm j;15  BONUS is the average bonus compensation as 
a proportion of total compensation received by the top five executives of a firm; and 
OPTION represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of 
total compensation received by the top five executives of a firm.  The variables BONUS 
and OPTION are included to proxy for compensation and incentives variables that may 
induce opportunistic behavior in managers (these test for OBH).   
We include the variables GDP and IND_ROA as proxies for real economic activity.16  
We include these proxies to control for the effect of economic activity on earnings 
management.  While some of our measures of earnings management adjust for changes in 
real activity by construction (e.g., discretionary accruals), others do not (e.g., write-offs).  
As a result, what might be classified as opportunistic earnings management may in fact 
be a consequence of changing economic conditions, either because the metric itself has 
not been adjusted for real activity, or because the adjustment was not adequate.  In other 
                                                 
15 Guenther and Young (2000) provide evidence of a high association between ROA and the economic 
growth rate, indicating that ROA reflects real economic activity in a timely manner.  We exclude the firm 
in calculating the average industry ROA in order to avoid any mechanical associations among the variables 
in the regressions. 
16 Ideally, we would also have liked to include operating cash flows in order to proxy for the economic 
environment, but including operating cash flows would induce a mechanical relation with our earnings 
management variable (due to the way we construct EM_SCORE).  
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words, discretionary accruals, write-offs, etc. may also reflect firms’ responses to and 
representations of changes in economic conditions.  If this were true, then changes in 
earnings management metrics will coincide with changes in measures of economic 
activity such as operating cash flows, revenues, prior stock returns, industry performance, 
changes in gross domestic product, etc.  In this case, while increases in earnings 
management will be associated with increases stock return volatility, this association 
should diminish after controlling for changes in economic activities.  Further, we should 
observe no change in the relation between earnings surprises and stock price changes.  
Specifically, since earnings management is a proxy for changes in economic activities, it 
does not imply changes in the quality of earnings.17  As a result, we would not expect a 
reduction in the relation between earnings surprises and stock price changes.   
 We include control variables for the auditors in the above regression in order to 
examine whether the earnings management activity of firms audited by the large audit 
firms were different from the rest of the sample firms over the three sub-periods 
analyzed.  Note that we make no claim that differences in the earnings management 
activities (if any) of these firms were due to the monitoring activities of the audit firms, 
since there could be a self-selection, where certain types of firms select big audit firms.  
In addition, to the extent that audit firms specialize in specific industries and levels of 
earnings management are likely to vary across industries, the audit firm dummies may 
also control for industry characteristics.   
                                                 
17 However, as a caveat, a change of the transitory and permanent components of earnings will also change 
the relation between earnings surprises and stock price changes. 
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 Next, we examine the change in the informativeness of earnings over time and the 
relation between earnings management and earnings informativeness by estimating the 
following regression: 
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jqjq
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       (8) 
where the dependent variables are DEPjq = ANNVARjq and DEPjq = ANNRETjq 
respectively.  In the above equation, VAR_QTR is the variance of returns on all days in 
the quarter other than the three-day earnings announcement period, which controls for the 
variance of the information released for a firm during the entire quarter; and SURPRISEjq 
is the surprise in the earnings announcement for firm j in quarter q defined as follows.  
For the regression with ANNRETjq as the dependent variable, SURPRISEjq is measured as 
the earnings per share for the quarter less the earnings per share of the corresponding 
quarter in the previous year, scaled by the price.  For the regression with the dependent 
variable ANNVARjq, it is measured as the square of the directional surprise measure 
described in the preceding sentence.  For the regression with ANNRETjq as the dependent 
variable, we exclude the variable VAR_QTR from the regression.  The other variables are 
defined as in equation (7).  
  
6. Results  
Section 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics of earnings management and earnings 
informativeness.  Then, section 6.2 discusses tests of the determinants of earnings 
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management and section 6.3 presents the determinants of changes in the informativeness 
of earnings.  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Management and Earnings Informativeness 
 
Table 2 summarizes the eight individual components of EM_SCORE, our proxy of 
earnings management, EM_SCORE, and ANNVAR, our non-directional measure of 
information content.   To summarize the data, we estimate two regressions.   First, we 
regress each of the variables on a time trend and a dummy variable taking the value of 1.0 
in the post-SOX period (Q3, 2002 to Q4, 2003) and zero otherwise (Table 2, Panel A).  
Second, we regress each of the variables on a time trend, the post-SOX period dummy 
variable and a dummy variable taking the value of 1.0 for the  SCA period from Q3, 2001 
to Q2, 2002 (Table 2, Panel B).  We choose this procedure to describe the variables 
because many of our variables exhibit significant time trends (non-stationarity), rendering 
a traditional summary statistics uninformative. 
The results in Panel A indicate a significant over-time increase in each of the three 
discretionary accrual measures and the frequency of negative write-offs and an over-time 
decrease in the change in the ratio of inventory changes divided by changes in sales.  We 
detect no significant time trend in the ratio of changes in account receivable to sales and 
the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of cash flows from 
operations.  A positive time trend is also reflected by our aggregate earnings management 
proxy.  Jointly these results suggest that earnings management has been increasing over 
the sample period.  However, the dummy variable for the post-SOX period, while 
negative, is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Thus, this preliminary 
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analysis does not indicate that the passage of the SOX Act was associated with a decline 
in earnings management.   
We repeat this analysis in Panel B by adding a dummy variable for the SCA period.  
This addition does not change our conclusion regarding the time trend.  However, adding 
the dummy variable for the SCA period indicates that the passage of SOX was associated 
with a reduction in earnings management and that the SCA period was generally 
associated with unusually high level of earnings management.  Inspection of Figure 3 
provides insight as to why the addition of the SCA dummy variable changes the 
inferences obtained form the SOX dummy variable:  The figure indicates that the SCA 
period was indeed associated with a high level of earnings management.  As a result, not 
controlling for this effect (Panel A) results in a lower intercept and a higher slope which 
then results in a smaller reduction in earnings management in the post-SOX period.   
Finally, the last row of Table 2 documents a positive time trend for the earnings 
informativeness measure, indicating that earnings announcements became more 
informative in the sample period.  However, we find no difference in informativeness of 
earnings announcements between the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods (Panel A).  We 
find that the SCA period was characterized by a marginally lower announcement period 
return variance – this result is surprising as one would typically expect earnings 
management to be informative (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  Figure 4 plots ANNVAR 
over the entire 1987-2002 time period.  Interestingly, while the SCA and post-SOX 
periods are characterized by low announcement period return variances, the period 
immediately preceding the SCA period had an unusually high level of announcement 
period return variance.   
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In summary, the above analysis indicates that the overall level of earnings 
management decreased from the SCA period to the post-SOX period.  However, there 
was significantly higher earnings management during the SCA period as compared to the 
pre-SCA period.  One interpretation of this result is that the SCA period was 
characterized by higher earnings management, and the scandal firms were not just a “few 
bad apples,” but a representation of the high level of corporate misconduct.  Another 
observation is that although earnings management increased from the pre-SCA to the 
SCA period, it declined significantly from the SCA period to the post-SOX period.  
Whether this decline is a caused by the passage of the SOX Act, or due to other 
concurrent events (such as the negative publicity of the most egregious governance 
failures) cannot be inferred from the data.  Finally, the SCA period is characterized by 
lower (significant at the 10 percent level) informativeness.  The determinants of earnings 
management are analyzed next. 
 
6.2 Determinants of Earnings Management 
Table 3 presents the determinants of the level of earnings management by firms, as 
proxied by the principal factor analysis score, EM_SCOREjq.  We test OBH using 
compensation data from ExecuComp available for the 1992-2003.  The reduced sample 
consists of 33,595 observations.  To ensure that the inferences drawn are not affected by 
the sample we first re-estimate regression (7) excluding the compensation variables on 
both the full sample (Table 3, Panel A) and the ExecuComp subsample (Table 3, Panel 
B).  The results indicate that restricting the sample to the ExecuComp sub-set does not 
alter the main tenor of the results.   
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However, estimating (7) using both the full sample and the ExecuComp subsample 
results in one unexpected outcome:  we find a negative and significant coefficient for 
SCA.  We are surprised by this result, especially in light of the results in Table 2 and in 
Figure 3, indicating that the SCA period was characterized by unusually high earnings 
management.  Further investigation, however, indicates that this result is caused by the 
inclusion of IND_ROA.  Once we exclude IND_ROA, the coefficient on SCA becomes 
positive (t = 5.64).  One implication of these results is that earnings management was 
particularly high during the SCA period in industries that were performing poorly.  
Alternatively, poor economic condition may be accompanied by more accruals, write-
offs, etc.   
The results of regression (7) are reported in Table 3, Panel C.  The three dummy 
variables Q1, Q2 and Q3 are significantly negative, indicating that relative to Q4, there is 
less earnings management in the first three fiscal quarters.  This result is consistent with 
the notion that most contracts are based on annual numbers and, as a result, there is no 
benefit in managing accounting numbers before knowing what the annual results will be.   
Consistent with the preliminary analysis in Table 2, we find positive trends in the 
level of earnings management, indicating that earnings management increased over the 
sample period.  However, the quarterly trend variables are negative, indicating that the 
time trend was smaller (but still positive) for Q1-Q3.   
Both SCA and SOX are significantly negative, implying that, controlling for the other 
independent variables, both periods are characterized by lower earnings management.   
While this result coincides with our expectations for SOX, we are surprised that the SCA 
is also negative.  As indicated above, additional analysis shows that this result is caused 
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by the inclusion of the IND_ROA variable.  Excluding this variable results in a positive 
and significant coefficient for SCA (t = 2.17).    
Several simultaneous occurrences could have contributed to a decrease in earnings 
management after passage of SOX, including the increased vigilance of investors, 
auditors and regulators, and greater care taken by managers in financial reporting after 
the adverse publicity caused by the scandals.18   Thus, we are cautious in attributing the 
decrease in the level of earnings management solely to the passage of the SOX Act.  
Of greater interest are the potential explanations for the changes in the level of 
earnings management.   For the entire period, we find that the percentage of bonus 
compensation is not correlated with earnings management.  However, bonus is 
significantly positive in the SCA period and significantly negative in the post-SOX 
period.  However, despite the similarity of those two coefficients, we can reject the 
hypothesis that BONUS × SCA = -BONUS × SOX (F = 16.68, p < 0.01).  In contrast, the 
percentage of compensation derived from option is significantly positively correlated 
with earnings management for the entire period and this effect did not increase in the 
SCA period.  The coefficient for OPTION in the post-SOX period is significantly 
negative and of the same magnitude as the coefficient for the entire period; however, we 
can reject the hypothesis that OPTION = -OPTION × SOX (F = 24.59, p < 0.01).   
This result is reinforced by Figure 5 which plots bonus and option compensation 
(based on a Black Scholes valuation) as a percentage of total compensation.  The figure 
indicates that while bonus compensation was relatively stable around 15 percent over the 
entire period, option compensation increased from about 30-40 percent in the 1990s to 
                                                 
18 We thank the referee for pointing this out.  
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almost 90 percent in 2000-2001 time period.  Overall these results support OBH and 
identify option compensation as a primary variable that is correlated with earnings 
management.   
The coefficients for GDP and IND_ROA, our proxies for real economic activity, are 
negative and significant.   As indicated above, this result has two (not necessarily 
mutually exclusive) interpretations.  First, it suggests that even absent opportunistic 
behavior by managers, poor economic condition are accompanied by more accruals, 
write-offs, etc.  Second, corporations are more likely to manage earnings when conditions 
are poor.  However, even after controlling for economic conditions, we find a significant 
(albeit only at the 10 percent level) reduction in management following passage of SOX.  
Finally, we find evidence that the earnings management by clients of big auditors is 
significantly less than that of firms audited by non-big audit firms.  In unreported results, 
we did not find significant differences in earnings management between big and non-big 
audit firm clients between the pre-SCA, the SCA, and the post-SOX periods. 
 
6.3 Determinants of Earnings Informativeness 
The results for the tests on the informativeness of earnings (equation 8) are reported 
in Table 4.  Panel A corresponds to the results obtained when the dependent variable used 
is the variance of abnormal returns in the three-day earnings announcement period 
(ANNVARjq), while Panel B corresponds to the results obtained when the dependent 
variable used is the sum of abnormal returns in the three-day earnings announcement 
period (ANNRETjq).19   
                                                 
19 We also repeat these tests on the ExecuComp sample (not reported). The results are not materially 
different from those in the total sample.  
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The results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that ANNVARjq is positively correlated with 
VAR_QTR, the variance of abnormal returns in the quarter (excluding the three-day 
announcement period).20  The evidence indicates that earnings announcements became 
more informative over time in absolute terms.  However, we find no clear patterns across 
the quarters and across the quarters over time.  We find that the volatility of 
announcement period stock returns was lower in the SCA period and marginally higher in 
the post-SOX period.   Consistent with expectations, we find that earnings surprises are 
associated with larger return variances.  Earnings management is associated with higher 
absolute informativeness of earnings announcements.  However, the interaction between 
earnings management and earnings surprise is negative, indicating that earnings 
management reduces the informativeness of a given earnings surprise.  Finally, the results 
for the proxies for economic activity are mixed:  IND_ROA is not significant while the 
coefficient of GDP is negative and significant.    
Panel B reports the results for ANNRET.  The evidence indicates that earnings 
announcement abnormal returns were smaller for Q1 and Q3 than for Q4.  However, the 
coefficients of Time × Q1 and Time × Q3 indicate that the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns for Q1 and Q3 have been increasing over time.  We find the magnitude of 
earnings announcement abnormal returns did not differ across the three periods.  
Consistent with expectations, we find that earnings surprises are positively correlated 
with announcement period abnormal returns.  Finally, while we find no significant 
                                                 
20 This result may be due to one of two effects.  First, the positive coefficient may indicate that firms with 
large return variances have large variances across announcement and non-announcement days.  Second, it 
may indicate that there is a complimentarity in information: quarters with higher information flows have 
also more informative earnings announcements.  To discriminate across these two explanations, we re-
estimate (8) on a firm-by-firm basis.  The results indicate that the coefficient on VAR_QTR remains positive 
and significant on a firm-by-firm regression.  Thus, this implies that informative earnings are accompanied 
by releases of complimentary information throughout the quarter. 
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association between earnings management and earnings announcement abnormal returns, 
we find that higher earnings management reduces the association between surprises and 
abnormal returns – consistent with the notion that earnings management reduces the 
quality of earnings.   
Generally, the above evidence supports OBH.  Specifically, we find a significant 
association between earnings management and stock return volatility, even after we 
control for changes in economic activities.  Moreover, we find that earnings management 
decreases the absolute informativeness of earnings surprises and reduces the abnormal 
return for a given amount of earnings surprise, consistent with earnings management 
reducing the quality of earnings.  In fact, these results suggest that earnings management 
is informative but it reduces the informativeness of earnings surprises. 
 
7.  Robustness Checks 
 We perform two robustness checks in order to confirm that our earnings management 
metric, EM_SCORE, indeed is measuring what it is intended to measure, i.e., earnings 
manipulation activity by firms.  We first test how the scandal firms rank in terms of the 
EM_SCORE.  Since these firms were the most serious offenders, if the EM_SCOREs 
corresponding to these firms are high, then that assures that this metric we form using the 
factor analysis method is not simply capturing the common measurement error across the 
various individual variables. For each quarter we form earnings management scores for 
all the scandal firms (see Figure 1 for the list of scandal firms).21  Then divide all sample 
firms in either three or ten portfolios based on EM_SCORE and compute in which the 
                                                 
21 This includes the scores for all the scandal firm data we have for that particular quarter. 
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scandal firms would fall.  For both three group ranks and decile ranks, we find that in the 
later periods of the sample (particularly 2000 onwards), the scandal firms have the 
highest ranks in most quarters.     
In the second robustness test, we sort the firms by EM_SCORE and form 10 
portfolios for a given quarter q. Then we compute the mean EM_SCORE for each 
portfolio in q+1 and q+2 and compute the correlation of the portfolio ranks between q+1 
and q+2.  Next we repeat this analysis by sorting on the EM_SCOREs for the next 
available quarter, i.e., q+1, and construct 10 portfolios.  Again, we compute the 
correlation of the portfolio ranks between q+2 and q+3, and so on.  We find that the 
average correlation across all adjacent portfolios is approximately 0.5 and significant at 
the 1 percent level.  This test provides additional confidence in our earnings management 
index, and confirms that this index is not merely an aggregation of common measurement 
error across the individual earnings management variables.        
 
8.  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigates over-time changes in earnings management and 
informativeness of earnings disclosures, and whether passage of SOX affected earnings 
management and the informativeness of earnings.  Our results indicate that earnings 
management increased steadily over the sample period.  In addition to this trend, we find 
that earnings management increased dramatically during the period preceding SOX, 
followed by a significant decline after the passage of SOX.  However, the nature of our 
analysis does not provide conclusive evidence whether this reversal was caused by SOX, 
a response to the publicity to the scandals, or other concurrent events.    
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Our results indicate that the informativeness of earnings increased in absolute terms 
in the sample periods, but that there was no significant change in the earnings 
announcement window abnormal returns. Further, we find a marginally significant 
increase in the absolute earnings informativeness metric, but no significant change in the 
earnings announcement window abnormal returns following the passage of SOX.  
Finally, the evidence leads us conclude that the opportunistic behaviors of managers was 
one of the determinants of earnings management and the informativeness of earnings – 
primarily related to dramatic increases in the fraction of compensation derived from 
options.   
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FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF THE MAJOR SCANDALS IN 2001-2002 
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FIGURE 2: TIME PERIODS ANALYSED 
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Figure 3: Trends In Earnings Management 
1987-2003
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Legend Figure 3: This figure plots EM_SCORE, our metric for earnings management over 
the 1987-2003 sample period.   EM_SCORE is obtained by performing a principal factor 
analysis of the different earnings management metrics, including three measures of 
discretionary accruals (the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the 
modified Jones, the modified Jones model controlling for performance, and the modified 
Jones model controlling for both performance and growth, respectively); the ratio of the 
absolute values of total accruals and cash flow from operations; the ratio of the change in 
accounts receivables to the change in sales; the ratio of the change in inventory to the 
change in sales; and the frequency of negative special items. 
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Figure 4: Trends in Earnings Informativeness 
1987-2002
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Legend Figure 4: This figure plots the average firm-specific variance of the abnormal returns over 
the three-day earnings announcement window (days -1, 0, and +1). 
Figure 5: Trends In Incentive Compensation 
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Legend Figure 5: This figure plots the average he average bonus compensation as a proportion of 
total compensation received by the top five executives of our sample firms and the average 
Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by 
the top five executives of our sample firms. 
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Table 1A: Full Sample 
1987-2002 ; N = 81,061 
 25
th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  71.261 2,706.541 239.162 1015.811 16,505.351
Market 
Capitalization 55.861 2,478.202 214.191 954.572 13,009.873
Sales 16.044 442.772 55.351 223.000 1,714.361
Growth of Sales -0.0505 0.002 0.027 0.103 0.398
Total Accruals  -0.033 -0.014 -0.012 0.006 0.046
Absolute Accruals 0.008 0.029 0.021 0.039 0.029
Leverage 0.358 0.553 0.549 0.705 0.298
Market to Book 1.177 3.575 1.927 3.289 38.712
GDP 0.019 0.031 0.033 0.047 0.022
IND_ROA -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.013
Table 1B: ExecuComp Sample 
1987-2003; N = 33,581 
 25
th 
Percentile Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  300.66 5,090.60 767.451 2,445.58 25,266.34 
Market 
Capitalization 357.72 5,304.82 890.88 2,769.94 20,859.95 
Sales 80.89 875.792 207.675 631.50 2469.26 
Growth of Sales -0.038 0.007 0.031 0.098 0.335
Total Accruals  -0.030 -0.013 -0.012 0.004 0.041
Absolute Accruals 0.008 0.028 0.019 0.038 0.028
Leverage 0.375 0.541 0.543 0.680 0.255
Market to Book 1.618 4.430 2.501 4.090 48.007
BONUS 0.044 0.154 0.130 0.226 0.139
OPTION 0.194 0.347 0.312 0.461 0.200
Market Capitalization is measured as the price per share (Data 14) times the number of shares outstanding 
(Data 15). Total Accruals is the difference between operating cash flows (Data 108), adjusted for 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Data 78) and income before extraordinary items (Data 8); 
Leverage is total liabilities (Data 54) divided by assets (Data 44); Market to Book ratio is calculated as the 
market capitalization at the end of the fiscal quarter (Data 14 times Data 15) divided by the book value of 
common equity (Data 60). GDP is the percent change in the real gross domestic product from the previous 
quarter; IND_ROA is the average ROA of the industry to which the firm belongs, excluding the ROA of the 
firm; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the top 
five executives of a firm; OPTION represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation received by the top five executives of a firm. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Earnings Management and Informativeness Metrics over Time 
Q1, 1987 – Q4, 2003 
Panel A 
SOXcTimebaDep jq ×+×+=  
Panel B 
SCAdSOXcTimebaDep jq ×+×+×+=  Dependent Variables 
aˆ  bˆ  cˆ  aˆ  bˆ  cˆ  dˆ  
|DA1| 
0.018 
(10.32) 
0.002 
(12.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
0.021 
(14.57) 
0.002
(10.51)
-0.012 
(-3.58) 
0.017 
(6.30) 
|DA2| 
0.019 
(11.02) 
0.002 
(11.45) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.022 
(15.87) 
0.002
(9.94)
-0.012 
(-3.54) 
0.017 
(6.68) 
|DA3| 
0.028 
(8.67) 
0.003 
(7.22) 
-0.007 
(-0.98) 
0.034 
(15.65) 
0.001
(5.33)
-0.031 
(-6.14) 
0.037 
(9.20) 
|TA|/|CFO| 0.811 (11.81) 
-0.005 
(-0.65) 
0.130 
(0.92) 
0.700 
(12.68) 
0.017
(2.45)
0.571 
(4.47) 
-0.666 
(-6.54) 
∆AR/∆SALES 0.093 (2.45) 
-0.000 
(-0.07) 
-0.033 
(-0.23) 
0.082 
(2.05) 
0.002
(0.41)
0.017 
(0.11) 
-0.074 
(-0.96) 
∆INV/∆SALES 0.396 (60.73) 
-0.008 
(-11.32) 
0.038 
(1.49) 
0.400 
(60.32) 
-0.009
(-11.21)
0.019 
(0.74) 
0.027 
(2.09) 
Negative Write-
Off 
0.023 
(4.04) 
0.007 
(10.57) 
0.003 
(0.23) 
0.030 
(5.88) 
0.005
(8.46)
-0.026 
(-2.21) 
0.044 
(4.62) 
EM_SCOREjq 
-1.503 
(-9.96) 
0.190 
(10.75) 
-0.243 
(-0.76) 
-1.253 
(-11.91) 
0.132
(10.12)
-1.423 
(-5.84) 
1.784 
(9.19) 
ANNVARjq 
0.001 
(4.58) 
0.000 
(6.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
0.001 
(3.91) 
0.000
(6.60)
-0.000 
(-0.25) 
-0.001 
(-1.58) 
SOX is a dummy variable taking a value of 1.0 in the period from Q3, 2002 through Q4, 2003; SCA is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1.0 in the period from Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002; |DAj|; j = 1, 2, 3 is defined as the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones, the modified Jones model controlling for 
performance, and the modified Jones model controlling for both performance and growth, respectively; |TA|/|CFO|  is 
the ratio of the absolute values of total accruals and cash flow from operations; ∆AR/∆SALES is the ratio of the 
change in accounts receivables to the change in sales; ∆INV/∆SALES, is the ratio of the change in inventory to the 
change in sales; Negative Write-Offs represent the frequency of negative special items; EM_SCOREjq  is the score 
obtained by performing a principal factor analysis of the different earnings management metrics; ANNVARjq is the 
variance of the abnormal returns over the three-day earnings announcement window (days -1, 0, and +1) for firm j in 
quarter q. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Earnings Management  
Q1, 1987 – Q4, 2003 
 
SOXOPTIONSCAOPTIONOPTION
SOXBONUSSCABONUSBONUSROAIND
GDPBIGSOXSCATimeQTimeQ
TimeQTimeQQQSCOREEM
jqjqjq
jqjqjqjqjq
qjq
jq
××+××+×+
××+××+×+×+
×+×+×+×+××+××+
××+×+×+×+×+=
181716
15141312
11109876
543210
_
32
1321_
ααα
αααα
αααααα
αααααα
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Full Sample 
N = 80,963 
ExecuComp Sample  
N = 33,595 
  Coef. t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
Intercept  0.281 13.69  -0.029 -0.64  -0.114 -2.44 
Q1  -0.368 -15.70  -0.207 -4.07  -0.197 -3.89 
Q2  -0.315 -13.23  -0.230 -4.48  -0.223 -4.35 
Q3  -0.297 -12.54  -0.202 -3.89  -0.194 -3.76 
Time  0.019 11.40  0.035 10.58  0.031 9.32 
TimeQ ×1   -0.013 -5.83  -0.026 -5.63  -0.027 -5.89 
TimeQ ×2   -0.007 -2.85  -0.014 -3.06  -0.015 -3.25 
TimeQ ×3   -0.007 -2.93  -0.015 -3.29  -0.016 -3.47 
SCA  -0.037 -2.87  -0.055 -3.18  -0.126 -3.09 
SOX  -0.126 -2.42  -0.087 -3.16  -0.128 -1.70 
BIG  -0.211 -17.24  -0.074 -2.76  -0.076 -2.83 
GDP  -0.002 -1.40  -0.015 -6.81  -0.015  -6.89 
IND_ROA  -17.867 -69.30 -20.590 -57.98  -20.205 -56.52 
BONUS × 103    -0.196 -0.00 
BONUS × SCA     0.677 4.94 
BONUS × SOX     -0.686  -2.83 
OPTION × 103    0.378 14.98 
OPTION × SCA × 103    0.004 -0.05 
OPTION × SOX × 103    -0.342 -2.39 
 R2 / F  0.136 1066.97  0.179 611.63  0.186 427.42 
EM_SCOREjq is the score obtained by principal component factor analysis on a firm-quarter basis using 
|DA1|, |DA2|, |DA3|, |TA|/|CFO|, ∆AR/ ∆SALES, ∆INV/∆SALES, and Negative Write-Off; Q1, Q2, and Q3 
are quarter dummies; Time is defined as the calendar year minus 1987; SCA is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1.0 in the period from Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002 (SCA period), zero otherwise; SOX  is a dummy 
variable equal to 1.0 for all fiscal quarters ending after Q3, 2002 (post-SOX Period), zero otherwise; BIG is 
a dummy variable equal to 1.0 if the auditor is a big-eight audit (or their successors) firm; GDP is the 
percent change in the real gross domestic product from the previous quarter; IND_ROA is the average ROA 
of the industry to which firm j belongs, excluding the ROA of firm j; BONUS is the average bonus 
compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the top five executives of firm j; OPTION 
represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received 
by the top five executives of firm j. 
 42
 
Table 4 
Determinants of Earnings Informativeness  
Q1, 1987 – Q4, 2002; N=80,963 
jqjqjq
jq
jq
SURPRISESCOREEMSCOREEM
ROAINDGDPSURPRISESOXSCATimeQ
TimeQTimeQTimeQQQQTRVARDEP
××+×+
×+×+×+×+×+××+
××+××+×+×+×+×+×+=
__
_3
21321_
1514
1312111098
76543210
αα
αααααα
αααααααα
Dependent Variable ( jqDEP )  
Panel A Panel B 
 jq
ANNVAR  
Coef.          t-stat 
jqANNRET  
Coef.            t-stat 
Intercept × 103     0.551 2.93  6.960 4.05 
VAR_QTR  0.526  81.92  NA NA 
Q1 × 102  -0.024 -0.87  -0.817 -3.29 
Q2 × 102  0.054 1.96  -0.364 -1.45 
Q3 × 102  -0.001 -0.04  -1.026 -4.10 
Time× 104   0.673 3.83  -2.002 -1.25 
Q1 × Time × 104  0.519 1.96  11.300 4.65 
Q2 × Time × 104  -0.533 -1.93  1.459 0.58 
Q3 × Time  × 104  0.346 1.25  7.278 2.86 
SCA × 102  -0.069 -4.60  -0.126 -0.91 
SOX × 102  0.108 1.80  0.563 1.22 
SURPRISEjq× 102  1.504 13.45  11.915 27.36 
GDP× 103  -0.035 -2.07  0.103 0.66  
IND_ROA× 106  0.164 0.01  0.595 0.00 
EM_SCOREjq × 103  0.274 6.66  0.778  2.13 
EM_SCOREjq × SURPRISEjq × 103  -1.970 -2.74  -5.040 -1.77 
R2 / F   0.089  565.81   0.011 68.11 
ANNVARjq is the variance of the abnormal returns over the three-day earnings announcement window (days -1, 0, and +1) for 
firm j in quarter q; ANNRETjq is the sum of abnormal returns over the three-day earnings announcement window for each 
firm and each quarter;  VAR_QTR is the variance of returns on days other than the three-day earnings announcement period.; 
Q1, Q2, and Q3 are quarter dummies; Time is defined as the calendar year minus 1987;  SCA is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1.0 in the period from Q3, 2001 through Q2, 2002 (SCA period), zero otherwise; SOX is a dummy variable equal to 
1.0 for all fiscal quarters ending after Q3, 2002 (post-SOX period), zero otherwise; SURPRISEjq is the surprise in the earnings 
announcement for firm j in quarter q defined as follows: for the regression with ANNRETjq  as the dependent variable it is 
measured as the earnings per share for the quarter less the earnings per share of the corresponding quarter in the previous 
year scaled by price, and for the regression with the dependent variable ANNVARjq  it is measured as the square of the 
surprise metric described the preceding sentence; GDP is the percent change in the real gross domestic product from the 
previous quarter;  IND_ROA is the average ROA of the industry to which the firm belongs, excluding the ROA of the firm; 
EM_SCOREjq is the score obtained by principal factor analysis on a firm-quarter basis using|DA1|, |DA2|, |DA3|, |TA|/|CFO|, 
∆AR/ ∆SALES, ∆INV/∆SALES, and Negative Write-Off. 
